This study re-examines the theory of legal-origin on the basis of a new longitudinal dataset on creditor protection for four OECD countries over a long time span . It observes that the civil law countries (France and Germany) provided better creditor protection relating to debtors' control while the common law countries (UK and USA) provided better creditor protection relating to credit contract and insolvency. Through dynamic panel data modelling our study shows that debtors' control has a long-term favourable effect on credit market expansion while the credit contract component of creditor protection has the opposite effect.
Introduction
The idea that law matters for a proper capitalist development can be traced back to the writings of famous German social scientist, Max Weber. Comparing the experience of industrialising countries of Western Europe with other countries Weber concluded that a rational legal system is a precondition for the emergence of capitalism. Some legal scholars call it 'endowment perspective' because it treats legal system as an endowment (created by fixed investment), which determines the path of development 'without itself being subject to change' (for details see Milhaupt and Pistor, 2008, pp.18-22) . North (1990) had a similar viewpoint. He argued that rich nations have managed to form proper institutions that protect property rights and enforcement contracts while poor countries lack these institutions and so fail to develop.
The works of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (henceforth, 'LLSV ', 1997, 1998) and the subsequent works by them and their followers (see La Porta et al., 1999 Porta et al., , 2000 2006 , 2008 Djankov et al., 2003; Shleifer, 2002, 2003; Beck et al., 2003a Beck et al., , 2003b Botero et al., 2004 ) infused a strong 'leximetric' flavour to this 'endowment perspective' of law. La Porta and his collaborators and followers used (by and large) binary variables (0, 1) to quantify the quality of various types of law existing in a large number of countries protecting the interests of their shareholders, creditors and labourers (these are what we call 'leximetric' data). The countries were classified according to their 'legal origin': English common law and civil law are two broad categories. The civil law systems were 3 further sub-divided into those of French, German and Scandinavian origin. Through various cross-section regression studies of these 'leximetric' data, it was argued that English common law systems are more market-friendly; they provide higher level of shareholder and creditor protection to promote financial development and create more employment opportunities by providing less protection of their labour.
This literature connects with other contemporary works which show financial development promotes economic growth (see King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997 Levine, , 2001 Levine, , 2003 Levine and Zervos 1998; Levine et al 2000; Beck et al 2000b; Claessens and Laeven, 2003) . Hence, the conclusion that follows from this whole gamut of literature is that legal origin matters for economic development. Some works even find that the common law countries grew faster than the civil-law countries (Mahoney, 2001 ).
There are two inter-linked postulates that can be found in this literature: 'Quality of Law' or 'law matters' and 'Legal Origin' (see also our earlier paper, Armour et al 2009a):
1. 'Quality of Law': Legal rules shape economic outcomes according to how far they support market-based economic activity as suggested in new institutional economics (North, 1990) . It is argued that legal protection of the interests of the shareholders and creditors will increase the flow of investments and enhance the availability of external finance to firms (La Porta et al. 1998 , 2008 Djankov et al. 2003; Claessens & Laeven 2003) .
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'There are structural differences between common and civil law, most notably the greater degree of judicial independence in the former and the lower level of scrutiny of executive action in the latter, that provide governments with more scope for alteration of property and contract rights in civil law countries'.
The works of LLSV and their followers, which support 'the endowment perspective of law', have created a furore in the academic world. At the same time, their works have driven the legal reform policies of the World Bank and other institutional organisations towards Anglo-Saxon legal system (thereby adding another dimension to globalisation, which can be called 'globalisation of law'). The World Bank has funded much of the subsequent works of LLSV and created a database that assigns score to each country for their legal institutions to protect the interests of shareholders, creditors, employers (vis-à-vis employees) and other stakeholders.
In this perspective, we shall re-examine the LLSV theory on the basis of a new dataset available from the source of Centre for Business Research, CBR (University of Cambridge, UK) for four OECD countries (UK, USA, France and Germany) over a long time span 1970-2005. 1 In the LLSV theory of legal origin, the three countries, England, France and Germany, may be termed as "mother countries".
These are essentially countries where different legal systems originated, and subsequently spread to developing countries often through colonisation and 1 CBR data over a long time span, 1970-2005 are available for five countries: four OECD countries covered in this paper and India. 6 conquest. In the US, not a mother country, the Anglo-Saxon system reached a high level of development and the model was exported to other countries.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a critique of the LLSV theory. Sections 3 and 4 outline the results of our empirical analysis and Section 5 concludes.
Legal Origin Theory: A Critique
The legal origin postulate suffers from serious conceptual problems. Scholars of comparative law argue that the classification of countries by reference to legal origins is not always clear and point out that in reality most legal systems are hybrids. For instance, South African law derives from both civil law and common law traditions; Japanese company law used to be based on the German model but, since the 1950s, has been heavily influenced by the US law; Swiss company law is influenced by the UK legal system and, due to the influence of the EU, UK law itself has become more 'continental' (Siems, 2007) .
The mechanisms by which legal origins exert their influence-through the 'political' and 'adaptability' channels are strongly questioned by the modern scholars of corporate law. For example, under current French practice judges interpret the law whereas English judges on the other hand have less scope than before in view of the detailed descriptions contained in modern English law, such as 7 the company law (Deakin & Singh 2008) . The French judges are also able to have discretions by appealing to the Roman law concept of "good faith".
Furthermore, the empirical base of the LLSV theory can be questioned and a number of strong critical points can be raised (see also, Armour et al, 2009a):
1. LLSV data lack transparency. For any index to be a meaningful representation of the effects of legal rules across different jurisdictions, it must contain coding which corresponds to the state of the law in the different countries under review. It should take into account relevant cross-national differences in the operation of legal rules.
There is always room for differences of view in the way that legal rules are interpreted. When the coding of LLSV's "shareholder rights" indices was checked by independent experts, numerous coding errors were revealed, casting serious doubts on the main findings of LLSV (Spamann, 2006 (Spamann, , 2008 Ahlering and Deakin, 2007) .
For example, regulatory takeover codes are generally thought to play a major role in underpinning minority shareholder rights and encouraging the dispersion of ownership in some common law systems, such as the UK and Australia, but this type of regulation is absent in the United States. In the latter country certain specific rules of securities law, the law of fiduciary duties and a more permissive approach to shareholder-led litigation play a similar role (Armour and Skeel, 2007) .
4. Fourthly, the legal indices in large part rely only on formal legal rules-that is, the 'law on the books', as opposed to the 'law in action'. Differences in judicial quality, legal procedure, social norms, and a host of other factors may make the operation of legal rules in practice very different from their formal characterization.
The gap between formal law and law in practice does not affect all countries equally; this poses a problem for the indexing methodology. Moreover, the form taken by a particular law may reflect the practical impact of that rule on parties subject to it. That may depend on factors outside the scope of the legal indices, including social and cultural norms beyond the law. The social or economic effect of a given legal rule can only be understood by seeing law as part of a system of interlinked norms, some of which are extra-legal in nature (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998 ). Firstly, CBR indices take into account a wider range of legal and regulatory information, which are functional equivalent of 'hard' laws whereas LLSV focused mainly on 'positive' legal rules. All primary legal sources are set out in the documents constituting the CBR datasets, a practice not followed by LLSV. Thirdly, the CBR data cover a wider range of legal norm than LLSV. In practice, many rules of company law and securities law are 'default rules' which may apply or not depending on how the parties to particular transactions choose to deal with them. The norms of corporate governance codes, which follow the 'comply or explain' approach, offer an illustration of this: companies have a choice of either conforming to the relevant norm, or disclosing their reasons for not complying with it. However, this is also a feature of many statutory rules of core company law.
Each of these types was included within the CBR coding. In Table 1 To sum up, our study of the leximetric data of four major countries (from the perspective of legal origin) over a long span of time provides no clear verdict in favour of the LLSV proposition that the common law system is superior to civil law in protecting the interests of creditors. The supremacy of common law in providing overall creditor protection is due to high level of protection offered by USA and UK in the field of credit contract and by UK in the field of insolvency. In both cases, civil law showed a tendency towards catching up -in the former case, France provided the driving force and in the latter case, the driving force came from both France and Germany. In the field of creditor protection relating to debtors' control, the supremacy of civil law is provided by Germany. This aspect of creditor protection also exhibited a tendency towards convergence because of legal changes in both UK and USA.
Does Law Matter?
In this section, we shall examine 'whether law matters'; whether a country with higher creditor protection experiences greater development of its credit market. Now the crucial question is how far this higher financial development in the common-law group is due to creditor protection. We shall seek an answer to these questions through dynamic panel data modelling (discussed below). To control for the level of economic activity of a country we shall consider real GDP in purchasing power parity constant dollars, deflated by population, PPPCY. The relevant data are also available from the World Development Indicators of World Bank.
Dynamic Panel Data Analysis: Estimates of Short run and Long-run

Relationships
For a large time dimension of panel data (as we have here), showed that the traditional procedures for estimation of pooled models, such as the fixed effects, instrumental variables, and generalized method of moments (GMM) 'can produce inconsistent, and potentially very misleading estimates of the average values of the parameters in dynamic panel data models unless the slope coefficients are in fact identical (Pesaran and Shin, 1999, p.622) . Therefore, to ascertain the nature of the relationships between financial development and creditor protection we shall use the Pesaran-Shin dynamic panel data analysis.
We start with a postulate of long-run relationship involving X (two credit market development indicators such as DCBY and DCPVTY, taken one at a time, in natural log), Y (per capita GDP, PPPCY in natural log) and Z (various creditor protection indexes taken one at a time):
where i (=1,2,3,4) represents countries, t (=1,2,… T) represents periods (years), ψ i and π i are the long-run parameters and η it is the error term.
We are interested to know whether there exist long-term and short-term effects of Z (creditor protection) along with Y (per capita GDP measuring economic activities) on X (credit market development indicators) and whether there exists a stable adjustment path from the short-term relationship (if any) to the long-run relationship.
Following Pesaran and Shin (1999) , our panel data analysis is based on the following error correction representation:
where ∆ is the difference operator, θ i is the country-specific error-correcting speed of adjustment term, λ ij ,ψ ik and π ij are the coefficients of the lagged variables, µ ι is the country fixed effect and φ it is the disturbances term. The existence of a meaningful long-run relationship with a stable adjustment dynamics requires θ i < 0.
Under this general structure, we can have three alternative models. On one extreme, we can have dynamic fixed effect estimators (DFE) where intercepts are allowed to vary across the countries and all other parameters and error variances are constrained to be the same. At the other extreme, one can estimate separate equations for each country and calculate the mean of the estimates to get a glimpse of the over-all picture. This is called mean group estimator (MG). showed that MG gives consistent estimates of the averages of parameters. The intermediate alternative is pooled mean group (PMG) estimator, suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1999) . It allows intercepts, short-run coefficients and error variances to differ freely across the countries but the long run coefficients are constrained to be the same; that means, ψ i = ψ and π i = π for all i while θ i may differ from group to group. Hausman test supports the DFE model for the case of private credit-GDP ratio giving more credence to the findings (Table 2 , Part B).
3. As regards the impact of creditor protection relating to credit contract (CRCC), the opposite (of what we have observed for CRDC) holds good: two models (PMG and DFE) show long-term negative effect of CRCC (with no significant short-term effect) on both the indicators of credit market development. In each case, the Hausman test supports the DFE model, which shows a stable adjustment process from a short-term no relationship to long-term negative relationship (Table 2 , Part C).
3. The PMG model shows that the long-term impact of creditor protection relating to insolvency (CRINS) is negative on both the indicators of credit market 20 development and there exists a stable adjustment process from insignificant shortterm relationship to long-term negative relationship. Neither MG model nor DFE model shows a significant short-term or long-term effect. Hausman test supports the DFE model (Table 2 , Part D).
Summary and Conclusion
Analysing the available data of the legal origin 'mother' countries over a long time 
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To sum up, our study based on longitudinal data for four OECD countries does not provide an unequivocal support to the proposition that common-law countries provide more protection to their creditors, which in turn promote their credit market developments. where ∆ is the difference operator, θ i is the group-specific error-correcting speed of adjustment term, λ ij ,ψ ik and π ij are the coefficients of the lagged variables, µ i is the country-specific effect and φ it is the disturbances term. The existence of a meaningful long-run relationship with a stable adjustment dynamics requires θ i < 0. Common Law vs. Civil Law:
Creditor Protection Relating to Debtors' Control, 1970 -2005 Figure 5
Creditor Protection Relating to Credit Contracts in Four OECD Countries, 1970 -2005 Figure 6
Common Law vs. Civil Law:
Creditor Protection Relating to Credit Contracts, 1970 Contracts, -2005 Figure 7
Creditor Protection Relating to Insolvency in Four OECD Countries, 1970 Countries, -2005 Figure 8
Creditor Protection Relating to Insolvency, 1970 Insolvency, -2005 Figure 9
Bank Credit-GDP Ratio in Four OECD Countries, 1970 Countries, -2005 Figure 10
Private Credit-GDP Ratio in Four OECD Countries, 1970 Countries, -2005 
